Housing policies are a complex set of taxes, benefits and incentives. This paper evaluates the redistributive effect of a comprehensive set of housing-related policies, taking into account the housing advantage of homeowners and social tenants. We use the Euromod microsimulation model to simulate housing policies in Estonia, Italy and the United Kingdom. Disentangling the contribution to inequality and poverty of each housing-related policy, we find that the current design of property taxes is not progressive and that other housing policies have a limited impact on inequality in Estonia and on both inequality and relative poverty in Italy. Only in the UK are housing policies more important than imputed rent in reducing inequality and poverty. In all three countries, housing-related policies favor the elderly. Although the United Kingdom has the most effective system of housing policies, Estonia seems to have the most efficient one.
Introduction and motivation
Housing represents a considerable part of household wealth and spending. In recent decades there has been a surge in house prices and a parallel increase in the share of household spending on housing in most OECD countries. The increase in house prices was driven not only by economic and demographic factors (declining interest rates, positive net migration, changes in household structure), but also by public intervention. Financial deregulation, mortgage innovation and favourable tax treatment of homeownership have all contributed to this trend. The contemporaneous increase in the rate of homeownership is only partially explained by population aging and is potentially an outcome of this policy set-up (Andrews et al., 2011) .
In the same period most OECD countries made large use of mortgage interest tax deductions. This policy represents a subsidy to home-ownership. The most widely used argument in support of mortgage interest deductions is that boosting homeownership strengthens the stake that people have in society (Glaeser and Shapiro 2003) . Nonetheless, the effect of mortgage interest tax deductions on the probability of homeownership is questionable, suggesting that the impact is rather on the quantity of housing consumption (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003) . In more tightly regulated housing markets mortgage interest deduction may even have an adverse impact on the likelihood of homeownership, due to capitalization of the mortgage tax subsidy into house values (Hilber and Turner, 2010) . Over-consumption of housing and its effect on house prices translates into a redistribution from new entrants in the housing market to insiders (Andrews et al., 2011) . Moreover, mortgage interest tax deductions are regressive (Mastaganis and Flevotomou, 2007) . The disequalizing effect and the missed tax revenues of this form of tax relief eventually led some countries to introduce limitations (e.g. Estonia in 2005) and abolition (Germany 1987 , France 1997 , the UK 2000) (Mastaganis and Flevotomou, 2007) .
The behavioural and redistributive effects of this housing-related policy depend on the national extent of mortgage take-up, which in turn depends on some country-specific characteristics such as development of the credit market and household structure. Indeed, both the share of outright homeowners and the share of homeowners with an outstanding mortgage vary widely across countries. The share of outright homeowners is high in Mediterranean and Eastern European countries (above 50%), while the share of homeowners with a mortgage is high in most Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries (above 30%). 1 Similarly, homeownership is boosted by the partial or full exemption of capital gains and imputed rent from taxation. Although homeownership is an important asset among low-income people, a well-designed reform introducing taxation of imputed rent can achieve redistributive goals. In a study for a set of European countries, a revenue-neutral reform that includes imputed rent in taxable income while introducing a lump-sum tax credit is inequality reducing . A study on Japan shows that inclusion of imputed rent in taxable income, as well as financial wealth income, guarantees a more progressive distribution of (a broad concept of) income (Yagi and Tachibanaki, 1998) .
Governments need to collect revenues and an easy (though politically difficult) way to do this is to tax an immovable and stable 2 tax base such as property. Property taxation generally affects the same households who benefit from government intervention designed to promote homeownership. Property taxation is deemed to be progressive as a tax on capital for the upper end of income distribution and regressive for its excise effect at the lower end, due to larger expenditure on housing services (Musgrave, 1974) . Nonetheless, property taxes are generally local taxes and they are often designed more as service than capital taxes. Moreover, property taxes are often based on outdated cadastral values. Pellegrino et al. (2011) find that, in Italy, replacement of cadastral incomes from dwellings with taxation of imputed rent estimated at market values would guarantee more progressive results. However, the elderly would be worse off as the typical composition of their income (pensions and imputed rent) would not benefit from a reduction in marginal personal income tax rates due to extension of the tax base.
Beyond the above mentioned housing-related policies, governments use other instruments for redistributive purposes such as that of housing affordability. This policy aim is normally pursued through housing subsidies, provision of social housing and rent control.
Generally, most households are eligible for mortgage interest deductions, while housing subsidies and social housing are generally targeted at households at the bottom of income distribution. Governments may pursue further objectives through other housing-related policies. For instance, the Italian tax code includes a deduction for refurbishment of buildings. In the post 2008 years, this deduction continues to be extended and its requirements relaxed with the aim of boosting business in the housing sector.
Although oriented towards different aims, these interventions have a redistributive impact on household income. This study extends the existing literature by considering a comprehensive set of housing-related policies 3 on the redistribution of a broad concept of income (including imputed rent). The effect of these policies is assessed by taking into account the housing advantage of households, which is measured by imputed rent. The importance of including imputed rent for better measurement of the economic well-being of households is well summarized in Frick et al. (2010) and Eurostat (2010a Eurostat ( , 2010b .
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that evaluates a comprehensive set of housing policies taking into account imputed rents. A similar work is Matsaganis and Flevotomou (2007) , which assesses the redistributive effect of mortgage interest deductions and housing benefits in five European countries. However, they do not consider the relative advantage that outright homeowners have compared to homeowners with an outstanding mortgage. We evaluate the marginal redistributive effect of each housing policy for different quintiles of extended income distribution, different tenure and age groups in Estonia, Italy and the United Kingdom.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and methodology used. Section 3 contains an overview of housing-related policies in Estonia, Italy and the UK and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the findings on inequality and relative poverty for different income, tenure and age groups. Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusive comments.
Data and methodology

EUROMOD and input data
For the tax and benefits structure we use the EUROMOD micro-simulation model. The input data used in EUROMOD are the 2003 UK Family Resources Survey (FRS), the Estonian and Italian national versions of EU-SILC 2006. Income refers to 2005, as well as the policy year used for this analysis. 2006 EU-SILC data contain information on estimated imputed rent, mortgage interest payments and property taxes paid. 4 Other housing-related policies are simulated with EUROMOD. The current analysis is restricted to Estonia, Italy and the United Kingdom as these are the only countries for which the input data used in version 3+ of EUROMOD contain both information on imputed rent 5 11 and on property tax paid.
The UK has the most reliable data and simulations of housing taxes and benefits, although lack of relevant administrative data for the other two countries makes comparison of property taxes difficult. Both the number of tax payers and the amount of tax revenues from Council Tax are well represented in the FRS data (Table A1 and A2). The EUROMOD simulation of Council Tax Benefit is over-estimated by 22%, even in the non-take up option
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, and may be explained by underreporting of non-simulated benefits and under-simulation of tax credits, which are also taken into account for entitlement to this benefit (Haux et al., 2010) . For Italy, administrative sources of property tax revenues do not distinguish between the share paid by households and the share paid by other subjects (business activities, hospitals, etc.). Household residences comprise 49% of total buildings (according to 2011 Census data) while about 36% of total recurrent property tax revenues corresponding to ICI were due for the main residence (Pellegrino, 2006) . Although property tax paid in IT SILC does include the amount paid on second homes and the ratio of residences over total buildings is only a rough approximation of the share of recurrent property taxes paid by households, we can provide different tentative and approximate estimations of the coverage of the IT SILC property tax of 96% and 129% of actual revenues (Table A2) . Similarly, for Estonia no information is available on the share of Land tax revenues paid by households. Available external figures show that Land tax is underrepresented by 70% in EE SILC data, although the extent could be smaller with the relevant figures.
Housing benefits are well simulated for the UK, while the values for Estonia and Italy correspond to a 50% overestimation of actual expenditure (Table A2 ). For Estonia, although the number of recipients of housing benefits (Subsistence Benefit) is under-simulated by 20% (Table A1) and non-take up is taken into account 7 , the over-estimation of expenditure is partly due to the simplified rules used for calculating housing costs and additional job search requirements asked by local governments but not taken into account in Euromod (Vork et al., 2010) . 4 EUROMOD uses the EU-SILC variable "Regular taxes on wealth" for property tax. This variable corresponds to the overall amount paid for property tax that may include the tax paid on properties beyond the main residence. However, EU-SILC input data do not provide values of imputed rent for properties that are not the household's main residence. 5 ollection of data on imputed rent in the EU-SILC survey is compulsory only since 2007. 6 Different take-up probabilities for different claimant types are specified in UK EM CR. 7 If the simulated subsistence benefit is smaller than 100 EEK or less than 10% of the household's disposable income the benefit is not applied for.
In general, income components are well represented in Euromod input data and simulations, as well as income taxes. For benefits, while some are relatively well-estimated (e.g. family benefits), others are substantially under (e.g. unemployment benefit in Estonia, Working Tax Credit in the UK) or over-estimated (housing-related benefits).
Imputed rent
The utility that households derive from housing depends on whether they own a house, have an outstanding mortgage, pay a below-market rent or live in a house for free. Tenants paying a rent at market price do not enjoy any housing advantage.
Assessment of the distributional effect of housing-related policies should take into account the non-monetary housing advantage enjoyed by households and the exemption of imputed rent from taxation, given that the literature agrees on the considerable distributional effect of imputed rent (Frick et al., 2010 , Eurostat, 2010b . As a result, assessment of the distributional effects of property taxes and mortgage interest deductions is misleading if it does not take into account the housing advantage of households.
However, several ways to measure imputed rent are available. Following Eurostat (2010a, 2010b) and Frick et al. (2010) we can distinguish between two approaches and five methods.
1. The rental equivalence approach involves estimating the market rent that homeowners or below-market rate tenants should pay if they had to rent their places at full price. Rental equivalence may be estimated by four methods. a. The first method is an objective measure: the rental equivalence is estimated by a hedonic regression (with Heckman correction). b. The second measure is objective and is based on the stratification method. c. The third method is based on a subjective measure: direct self-assessment of the (would-be) chargeable rent. d. The fourth measure is subjective and is based on the stratification method. 2. The capital market approach is radically different, as it corresponds to the potential returns from investing the house value in an alternative portfolio.
The values of imputed rent used in this analysis are based on the estimation by EU-SILC national teams for Estonia and Italy, while for the United Kingdom estimates are based on Mullan et al. (2007) . Unfortunately for comparative purposes, estimates of imputed rents in the three countries are based on different approaches. For Estonia, imputed rents are estimated with the capital market approach (Vork et al., 2010) . For Italy, imputed rents are based on a subjective assessment. Finally, for the United Kingdom imputed rents are calculated by the opportunity cost method: mortgage interest payments, maintenance costs, charges and structural insurance are deducted for owner-occupiers (Mullan et al., 2007) . For Estonia and Italy we obtain net imputed rent by subtracting mortgage interest payments from estimated imputed rent. Following the approach adopted by Frick et al. (2010) we replace negative values of net imputed rent with zero 8 .
For the United Kingdom, social imputed rent is calculated as the difference between estimated market rent and the rent actually paid by tenants in subsidized or reduced rent housing 9 (Mullan et al., 2007) . The same holds for Estonia. For Italy social imputed rent is not available.
We distinguish between market and social imputed rent. The first is assigned to homeowners and free tenants
10
, while the second is assigned to social housing tenants and tenants who pay a rent below market value.
Benefit incidence approach
We assess the redistributive effects of housing-related policies with the benefit incidence method (OECD, 2008) . The benefit incidence method estimates the marginal distributional effect of an additional component of income. Box 1 below shows the step-by-step inclusion of housing-related policies in the broad concept of income.
As discussed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) the ordering of the various steps is not neutral: alternative orderings may produce different distributional outcomes. As far as possible, we introduce each step in a logical order. Households are ranked according to their original monetary market income (employment and self-employment income, income from property, investment income, private pensions, private transfers). In the second step, we add private imputed rent. We calculate disposable income as gross monetary income, minus taxes, plus transfers excluding those that are housing-related and, in a further step, we add private 11 imputed rent to this income. In the subsequent steps, we introduce each housingrelated policy one at a time in order to assess their marginal distributional impact. Private imputed rent is added before deduction of personal income taxes. Since in the three countries the considered imputed rent of the main residence is not included under the personal income tax base, we define this source of income as tax exempted. Property tax is introduced after inclusion of imputed rent, mortgage interest and other housing-related deductions, as this extended concept of disposable income defines the household's tax capacity. Fiscal deduction of property tax is introduced after payment of property tax. As a last step, we add social imputed rent for social housing tenants.
Box 1: Income steps, before and after taxes and benefits
Factor source decomposition (Shorrocks, 1982) is an alternative method used to assess the contribution of each income source to overall inequality. This method allows avoidance of assumptions about the order in which components are added together. However, the factor source decomposition method was not originally designed to assess the redistributive effect of taxes and benefits and some notable studies raised important questions on the comparison between the two methods. For instance, Fuest et al. (2010) analyze the redistributive effects of social contributions, direct taxes and cash transfers using both the benefit incidence and factor source decomposition methods. They find contrasting redistributive results. Similarly, Figari and Paulus (2012) use both methods to assess the contribution of different income sources and taxes to overall inequality. Notably, they find a disequalizing contribution of imputed rent and an equalizing contribution of indirect taxes by using factor source decomposition. These results are at odds with the bulk of related literature. On this basis, Figari and Paulus (2012) suggest that a reconciliation between the two methods deserves further research. We use a conservative stance and follow the mainstream literature on analysis of the redistributive effects of taxes and benefits and adopt the benefit incidence approach.
We calculate the income share change from one step to the other for each quintile of income distribution. Analysis by income quintiles shows which parts of income distribution are affected by housing-related policies. We calculate the marginal contribution to inequality and to relative poverty 12 of each policy. Furthermore, we consider the marginal redistributive effect of each housing-related policy for different tenure and age groups. The variation in the Gini coefficient achieved by the tax or benefit corresponds to the Reynolds-Smolensky index. The Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) is further decomposed into vertical redistribution (VE) and re-ranking (RR) effects:
where VE is given by the difference between the Gini coefficient and the concentration coefficient before and after, respectively, the inclusion of a given income concept and RR is given by the difference between the Gini and the concentration coefficient after the inclusion of a 12 Inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient. For the analysis by tenure and age groups we use the half squared coefficient of variation in order to disentangle inequality within and between groups. Relative poverty refers to individuals living in households in which the relevant concept of equivalised income is below 50% of the median at each step.
•
Original market income (A1)
• Original market income plus private imputed rent (A2)
• Income net of taxes and bene�its, excluding housing -related (B1)
• Income net of taxes and bene�its, excluding housing-related plus private imputed rent (B2)
• B2 plus mortgage interest deductions (C)
• C plus other housing-related deductions (D)
• D minus property tax (E)
• E plus deduction for property tax (F)
• F plus housing bene�its (G)
given income concept. The contributions of the vertical redistributive and re-ranking effects to the change in the Gini coefficient before and after inclusion of a given income concept are defined as:
3. Overview of housing-related policies and descriptive statistics
Mortgage reliefs
Mortgage interest payments may be fully (as in the Netherlands and Greece) or partially (as in Italy, Sweden and Finland) deductible from income tax (Mastaganis and Flevotomou, 2007) . Mortgage interest tax relief can also be granted as a tax credit. The United Kingdom abolished mortgage relief in 2000 (Mastaganis and Flevotomou, 2007) . In Estonia households can deduct 100% of their mortgage interest payments for the main house from taxable income. From 2005, the deductible amount of mortgage and study loan interest could not exceed 50000 EEK or 50% of taxable income (Vork et al., 2010) .
In Italy, mortgage interest payments for the purchase of the main residence can be deducted up to 3615, 20 euro 13 (Ceriani and Gigliarano, 2010) . In addition, in 2005 it was possible to claim a tax credit for 36% of the expenses incurred for refurbishment of buildings up to 48000 euro (Ceriani and Gigliarano, 2010) .
Property tax
In the United Kingdom property tax (Council tax) is charged to all occupiers of domestic properties and is based on the estimated market value of the property on 1 April 1991 (Mirrlees et al., 2011) . Properties are assigned to nine bands (A to I) according to their capital value. Each local authority sets a tax rate for band D and applies an increasing ratio for the other bands (Haux et al., 2010) . This tax is designed to be regressive relative to its tax base, as the proportion paid for Council Tax is lower the higher the value of the house (Mirrlees et al., 2011) . Council tax is reduced by 25% if the property is inhabited by only one adult resident and by 50% if nobody is resident (e.g. second home). Low income families are eligible for Council Tax Benefit 14 . This is a rebate of Council Tax. The amount depends on the characteristics of the household (e.g. single parent, disability, over 60). Council Tax Benefit is inversely proportional to income and can also be assigned to households with no one in work, such as unemployed and pensioner households (Haux et al., 2010) .
In 2005 Italy levied a municipal property tax (ICI) based on the cadastral value of the building plus 5% multiplied by a coefficient that differs according to the building type (Ceriani and Gigliarano, 2010) . In 2008, main residences were exempted from ICI, apart from luxury flats, castles, villas and palaces of historical or artistic importance. In 2012 property tax was re-introduced under the name of IMU, which was partially suspended in 2013. New forms of property taxation are under discussion for 2014, including a service tax option. In 2005 it was 13 In 2008 this amount has been raised to 4000 euro. 14 Council Tax Benefit has been replaced with Council Tax Reduction since April 2013. |VE| |RE| |VE| + |RR| |VE|+|RR| and not possible to deduct property tax from taxable income, although tax credits were available both for ICI and for IMU.
Estonia does not levy a property tax but a land tax. This is a state tax based on the assessed value of the land. Rates of Land tax range between 0.1% and 2.5% of the assessed value of the land. There are no fiscal deductions for Land tax.
Housing benefits
In the United Kingdom, Housing Benefit covers the cost of rent for low income families, including those not working. The subsidy consists of "eligible rent", corresponding to the rent paid. Premiums and allowances are granted according to household characteristics. Local authorities specify the maximal amount of "eligible rent".
Estonia offers a Subsistence Benefit guaranteeing a minimum income to all residents. If household income after payment of housing expenses (excluding mortgage interest tax payments) is below a defined subsistence level, the household is entitled to Subsistence Benefit. In 2005 the Subsistence level was 750 EEK for the household head plus 80% of this amount for any other member. Housing costs are subject to a limit according to household size and the square meters of the flat. It is a means-tested benefit.
The variable defined as housing benefits in Italian data includes rent-related benefits, mortgage benefits and a residual component. The residual component includes regional vouchers such as the Buono Casa. This voucher promotes the purchase of a main residence and is addressed to a specific type of household (usually young married couples). Table 1 shows the tenure structure of each country. Estonia and Italy have a large share of outright owners (76% and 60%, respectively), while the United Kingdom has a considerable share of homeowners with an outstanding mortgage (47%). There are two other striking differences between Estonia and Italy, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, on the other. These differences are related to the share of tenants in social housing and the share of tenants in the private market paying no rent. For social tenants the share is 18% in the United Kingdom versus no more than 5% in the other two. For free tenants the figures are 1% in the United Kingdom versus more than 7% in the other two. Table 2 reports the value of each housing related policy as a percentage of household equivalised disposable income. Private imputed rent has the largest contribution to disposable income in Estonia (31%), followed by Italy (18%) and the United Kingdom (10%). On the other hand, social imputed rent is more important in the United Kingdom than in Estonia (1.7% versus 0.3%).
Descriptive statistics
15 Similarly, housing benefits represent a large share of disposable income in the United Kingdom (3.8%) and a negligible share in the other two countries (less than 1%). The same applies to property tax: relatively important in the United Kingdom (5.5%) and negligible in the other two countries (1% or less).
The high proportion of outright owners and the relatively large importance of imputed rent especially at the bottom of income distribution in Estonia and in Italy (Table 2 ) are due to different reasons. In Estonia, the large share of outright homeowners is explained by the privatization process following the end of Communism, in which households could buy their homes for a relatively cheap price. This explanation suggests a diminishing redistributive role of imputed rent in the future. In Italy, the large share of outright homeowners can be explained by the traditionally low social expenditure on housing, which may have worked as an incentive for the accumulation of housing wealth at the bottom of income distribution (Maestri et al., forthcoming) . 
Discussion of results
Housing-related policies and inequality
The inclusion of market imputed rent in the definition of income has a clear redistributive effect. Indeed, adding the value of imputed rent to original income reduces inequality 16 , as shown by column 1 (grY) to 2 (grYIRpriv) in Tables 3, 4 and 5. In Estonia the effect is considerable (-15% in inequality). In Italy the effect is important (-8%), while in the United Kingdom the importance of private imputed rent seems smaller (-5%). The fall in inequality due to the inclusion of imputed rent when considering disposable income is smaller: -10%, -2% and -4%, respectively (columns netY and netYIRpriv in Tables 3-5). Frick et al. (2010) find a 3% and 6% decline in disposable income inequality for Italy and the United Kingdom, respectively, in 2004 17 . The values reported under column netY correspond to the change from gross monetary income (grY) to disposable monetary income (netY). The values reported under column netYIRpriv correspond to the change from gross income augmented with imputed rent (grYIRpriv) to disposable income augmented with imputed rent (netYIRpriv). In the top panel of Tables 3, 4 and 5 column grY reports gross monetary income shares, while from column netYIRpriv to column allHP the values reported correspond to the change with respect to the previous income step.
The redistributive effect of overall taxation is smaller for the broad concept of income than for monetary income. Indeed, the change in the Gini coefficient due to taxes excluding imputed rent from the calculation of income in column 4 (corresponding to the difference between column netYIRpriv and grYIRpriv, reported as the Gini coefficient under column netYIRpriv) is smaller than the change in inequality due to taxes when imputed rent is included in income definition (corresponding to the difference between column netY and grY, reported as the Gini coefficient under column netY) for all three countries (Tables 3, 4 and 5).
Mortgage tax reliefs are slightly regressive in Italy, but less than when the imputed rent is not included in the income concept as was done in Mastaganis and Flevotomou (2007) . Indeed, the first two quintiles slightly lose in relative terms with respect to the other three quintiles 18 . In Estonia the effect of mortgage interest tax relief is very limited in terms of income redistribution (column MortDed of Table 3 ).
Property taxes are slightly regressive in the United Kingdom, even after taking into account the reduction of property taxes for low income households (column PrTax of Table 5 ). In Estonia and Italy, property taxes have no redistributive effect (column PrTax of Table 3 and 4). 16 The Data Appendix reports inequality measured with the Gini coefficient. We also calculated inequality with the Theil index and the Half Squared Coefficient of Variation (not reported). The results with different inequality measures are completely consistent in all the tables. 17 Frick et al. (2010) used estimations of imputed rent based on regression and the opportunity cost approach (see AIM-AP project for more details: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/research-and-policy-analysis-usingeuromod/aim-ap/deliverables-publications). Due to the small population of private renters no Heckman correction was applied for Italy and the UK. In this analysis imputed rent for Italy is based instead on a subjective assessment. 18 Column MortDed of Table 4 shows no change for each quintile due to rounding; the actual changes are -0.02 for Q1, -0.01 for Q2, 0.01 for Q3 and 0.02 for Q4 and Q5. 19 For Italy, rounding of the results with more decimals shows a slightly regressive effect of mortgage deductions and property tax: the two bottom quintiles (especially the first) have a negative sign.
Housing benefits are clearly progressive in the United Kingdom, though they also generate a considerable re-ranking among households. Indeed, income re-ranking reduces the redistributive power of housing benefits by an amount corresponding to 9% of the absolute change in inequality 20 . In Estonia and Italy the redistributive effect of housing benefits is modest.
Inclusion of social imputed rent in the income concept (only possible for Estonia and the UK) improves the relative position of the bottom quintiles in the UK, where it also generates a considerable amount of re-ranking. In Estonia it has nearly no effect.
The last column of the bottom panel of Tables 3, 4 and 5reports the overall redistributive impact of all housing policies, excluding the distributional impact of tax exempted imputed rent 21 . Notes: grY = market income, IRpriv = private imputed rent, Ynet = disposable income before housing tax and transfers, MortDed = mortgage interests' payment relief, PrTax = -property tax, DedPrTax = + deduction for property tax, HouseBen= + housing benefits, IRsoc= social imputed rent, allHP = all housing policies (including private imputed rent in the top panel, excluding private imputed rent in the bottom panel). Quintile groups are formed by ranking individuals based on household original income equivalised with the OECD modified scale. Quintile share changes may not sum up to zero due to rounding. The Gini coefficient and Reynolds-Smolensky (RS) index are multiplied by 100. The contributions of (vertical) redistribution and re-ranking effects to the RS index are defined as in Section 2.3. The poverty line is set at 50% of the relevant median equivalised income (values are reported in the last row). Source: author's analysis based on EUROMOD 3+. 20 The absolute change in inequality is calculated as the sum of the absolute change in the Gini coefficient due to reranking and the absolute change in Gini due to redistribution. 21 This change corresponds to the difference between the values in column IRsoc and netYIRpriv. Table 3 . Source: author's elaboration based on EUROMOD 3+.
Housing-related policies and relative poverty
Housing benefits and social imputed rent are the most effective tools in reducing relative poverty. Indeed, poverty is reduced by 40% in the United Kingdom and by 7% in Estonia. In Italy, housing benefits generate a negligible reduction in the relative poverty rate (smaller than 1%). As previously mentioned, these benefits are targeted at homeowners and not to tenants as in Estonia and the UK.
Although British Council Tax increases relative poverty, the possibility for low income households to deduct this tax has a more than counterbalancing effect on the relative poverty rate. Moreover, if the tax exemption of imputed rent reduces the redistributive power of the tax system, it relieves some households at the bottom of income distribution, with the exception of Italy, where this tax exempted source of income does not reduce the number of households below the relative poverty threshold (see the poverty rate under columns netY and netYIRpriv of Table 4 ). Inclusion of (private and social) imputed rent in the income concept reduces the relative poverty rate by 3.5, 0.7 and 1.9 percentage points in, respectively, Estonia, Italy and the United Kingdom
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.
In Section 4.1 we noted that exemption of imputed rent from taxable income entails a potential redistributive loss. Nonetheless, in the UK this exemption has a favourable impact on relative poverty.
Housing-related policies and tenure categories
Tables 6, 7 and 8 report the results for the decomposition of inequality by tenure groups. The halfsquared coefficients of variation estimates show that inequality within tenure groups is higher than between tenure groups in all three countries. In Estonia (Table 6) , outright owners and free tenants are the categories who benefit the most from housing-related policies, while renters in the private market and homeowners with a mortgage lose in terms of relative extended income. The analysis by tenure categories for Italy shows similar results (Table 7) . Outright owners are the "winners" and renters in the private market are the "losers".
In the UK (Table 8) , outright owners and reduced-rent tenants are the categories who gain from housing-related policies, whereas homeowners with a mortgage are the losers. With respect to owners with a mortgage, outright owners have a relative advantage in the exemption of imputed rent from taxation. Reduced-rent tenants benefit from housing benefits and social imputed rent. Table 3 . HSCV btw = between groups Half squared coefficient of variation. HSCV wit = within groups Half squared coefficient of variation. Source: author's analysis based on EUROMOD 3+. Notes: see Table 3 . HSCV btw = between groups Half squared coefficient of variation. HSCV wit = within groups Half squared coefficient of variation. Source: author's analysis based on EUROMOD 3+.
Housing-related policies and age groups
Analysis by age of the household head points to a clear-cut result: the main "winners" are over 60 year-olds in all three countries (Tables 9, 10, and 11). In Estonia the main "losers" from housing-related policies are in the youngest age group (under 40), in Italy both the young and the middle aged (under 60) and, finally, in the UK the middle aged group (between 40 and 60).
The relative advantage of over 60 year-olds is clearly due to the inclusion of imputed rent in the concept of income. Outright homeowners are over-represented among over 60 year-olds than younger households, due to a simple life-cycle effect: they may have just finished paying off a mortgage 24 . Households in which the head is under 40 are better off in the UK than in Estonia or Italy. Indeed, these households are the target of British housing benefits and social housing. These cash and in-kind subsidies compensate for their disadvantage in terms of imputed rent. 24 However, in Estonia and Italy where the share of households with a mortgage is around 10% (2007 EU-SILC) the age aspect of the tenure structure may not be a life-cycle but a cohort effect. Table 9 : Income shares by age of household head, EE
Notes: see Table 3 . HSCV btw = between groups Half squared coefficient of variation. HSCV wit = within groups Half squared coefficient of variation. Source: author's analysis based on EUROMOD 3+. Table 3 . HSCV btw = between groups Half squared coefficient of variation. HSCV wit = within groups Half squared coefficient of variation Source: author's analysis based on EUROMOD 3+. Table 3 . HSCV btw = between groups Half squared coefficient of variation. HSCV wit = within groups Half squared coefficient of variation. Source: author's analysis based on EUROMOD 3+. Figure 1 reports the pattern of inequality from market income to a broader concept of income for the three countries considered. Figure 2 shows the contribution of imputed rent and (other) housing-related policies to the reduction of inequality in the same countries. Housing-related policies (including imputed rent) are most effective in reducing inequality in Estonia (-11%, in the UK -10%, in Italy -3%) and poverty in the UK (-56%, -28% in Estonia, no effect in Italy). However, by considering housing-related policies excluding imputed rent the United Kingdom has the most redistributive policies both for inequality (-7%, in Estonia nearly zero, in Italy zero) and for poverty (-39%, nearly zero in Estonia and zero in Italy). The green bar in Figure 2 shows this result. To sum up, in Italy housing policies are ineffective both in terms of inequality and relative poverty reduction. Inclusion of imputed rent on top of net income has a limited redistributive effect compared to the other two countries. Indeed, in Estonia the small extent (although progressive) of the effect of housing policies is compensated by the large redistributive effect of imputed rents.
A comparative assessments of housing-related policies
From an inequality-reducing standpoint, is the distribution of imputed rent more important than (other) housing-related policies? Only in the United Kingdom is the redistributive effect of housing policies more important than the effect of imputed rent (Figure 2 ). This finding holds not only in relative terms (the importance of imputed rent is smaller in the United Kingdom than in the other two countries), but also in absolute terms. From a poverty-reducing standpoint, the same question may be asked. Figure 3 plots the pattern of relative poverty defined by each housing-related policy. Figure 4 shows the contribution of imputed rent and housing policies to the reduction of poverty. In the UK, housing policies are by far the most important tool for reducing poverty with respect to the distribution of imputed rent (-51% versus -10%). In Estonia it is again imputed rent (evaluated with respect to distribution of net income) that reduces poverty (-22% with respect to 7% of housing policies), as well as, to a lesser extent, in Italy (-2% versus 0). Tax exempted imputed rent helps in reducing relative poverty (apart from Italy). This finding is illustrated by comparing the blue and red bars in Figure 4 . On the other hand, it reduces its potential impact on income inequality (the blue bar is larger than the red bar in Figure 2 ). These results suggest that tax exempted imputed rent helps improve the well-being of those who are income-poor and housing-rich, but it is not equitable at higher levels of income and imputed rents. Although the United Kingdom has the most effective housing policies in terms of inequality and poverty reduction, Estonia seems to have the most efficient ones. Table 12 shows the budget of housing policies in each of the three countries. The last column reports net housing revenues. Estonia collects the smallest amount of revenues from housing policies (less than 0.27% of GDP). However, for every 1% of GDP of net revenues from housing, the simulated reduction in inequality and poverty in Estonia is, respectively, 6% and 42% (Table 13) . These values are higher than in the United Kingdom and far higher than in Italy 25 . 25 However, in Italy the inequality and poverty reduction effects of housing policies may be an understimation of the actual effect, as data on social imputed rent are not available. The effect of the in-kind housing benefit is not expected to be large due to low social spending on housing and the low share of tenants living in public housing. Notes: efficiency is calculated as the % change in inequality and poverty due to housing policies (excluding the effect of imputed rent, which corresponds to the change from column netYIRpriv to IRsoc in Table  3 to 5) divided by effective net tax revenues for housing (Table 12 ).
Beyond the static effects of housing-related policies
The analysis does not consider behavioural responses to changes in the tax and benefit structure of housing-related policies. Behavioural responses to housing-related policies are beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we mention that mortgage interest tax deductions, property taxes and tax exempted imputed rent have an impact on the probability that households enjoy a positive imputed rent and its size. Indeed, the popularity of mortgage interest tax deductions, together with the development of the credit market, boosted homeownership rates and increased the chance of low income families to own a house (Andrews et al., 2011) . Similarly, low property taxes and exemption of imputed rent from taxable income make investment in housing more convenient than in other assets. In a behavioural framework, these three policies may be attributed to part of the redistributive effect due to imputed rent. We also mention that the current extent and distribution of housing wealth (and private imputed rent) may be due to economic factors such as high inflation (as in Italy during the '80s) and historical factors (as in Estonia). The surge in house prices in recent decades and consequently the increase in capital gains are another economic factor that explains the extent and distribution of imputed rent (if rents reflect house prices and imputed rent is measured by the "rental equivalence method"). The exemption of capital gains from taxation is the policy counterpart of this phenomenon.
Moreover, in a life-cycle perspective the distributional effects of housing-related policies may be different. As the analysis by age groups shows, the net gainers of housing-related policies, in particular the exemption of imputed rent from taxable income, are over 60 yearold household heads. This group is most likely to consist of households that have finished off repaying their mortgage loan.
Final remarks
The analysis in this study covers three countries with different housing regimes and policies. According to the Esping-Anders classification, the United Kingdom belongs to the liberal welfare state regime and Italy to the Mediterranean regime. However, housing regimes do not completely match the classification of welfare regimes (Eurostat, 2010a) . Indeed, the UK housing regime includes both liberal (mortgage indebtedness is common) and universalistic aspects (large share of no-profit housing). Italy is a typical example of the Mediterranean housing regime: a high level of homeownership, incentives for homeownership and an irrelevant amount of social spending for housing. Table 1 shows that 60% of Italian households are outright homeowners. This is also due to the demographic and household structure that Differences in housing regimes are mirrored in the structure of housing policies and their effect on the distribution of extended income. Indeed, housing-related policies are most important in the United Kingdom both for inequality and relative poverty, relevant in Estonia only for relative poverty, and irrelevant in Italy. Nonetheless, we can identify some common features of housing-related policies. In all three countries the extent of inequality is larger within than between tenure categories. The current design of property taxes is not progressive. Housing-related policies follow a life-cycle redistributive effect: gainers belong to the over 60 year-old age group, mostly due to the tax exempted imputed rent from taxable income.
Mortgage interest tax deductions have a slightly regressive effect, although this is limited in Estonia and Italy. These results are more conservative with respect to the existing literature (Mastaganis and Flevotomou, 2007) , as we include imputed rent net of mortgage interest payments in the income concept. Indeed, homeowners with a mortgage have a lower housing advantage than outright homeowners. In addition, the limited regressive effect that we find for mortgage interest tax deductions is also due to the small extent of mortgages in Italy and Estonia (around 10% of the population). Results for countries such as the Netherlands (where the share of homeowners with a mortgage is above 40%) 26 and the design of mortgage tax relief much more beneficial to high income earners would be definitely more regressive, as shown in Mastaganis and Flevotomou (2007) . The United Kingdom has a large share of owners with a mortgage (over 45% of the population), but mortgage interest tax deductions were abolished in 2000 27 .
Housing policies are most important in the UK's specific housing regime, both for inequality and relative poverty reduction. In a Baltic country, housing policies matter only for relative poverty reduction. In a Mediterranean country such as Italy housing policies seem to play no redistributive role. These results reflect the size of public expenditure on housing in the three countries: high in the United Kingdom and low in Estonia and Italy. Similarly, the regressive effect of Council Tax (before deductions) found for the United Kingdom is affected by the relatively large importance of property tax with respect to the other two countries. Although the United Kingdom has the most effective system of housing policies in terms of inequality and poverty reduction, Estonia seems to have the most efficient one.
The current policy debate suggests shifting taxation away from labour towards real estate (as well as towards VAT and green taxes) (European Commission, 2011; OECD, 2012 the results show that little redistribution is achieved with current forms of property taxation. The design of property taxes needs to be extensively revised in order to raise more revenues from households that also enjoy high economic wellbeing because of homeownership.
The theoretical literature suggests that exemption from property taxation of households with properties below a given threshold makes property tax a tax on capital. A tax on all properties, irrespective of their values, means also taxing the consumption part of housing. The empirical evidence presented here shows that property tax deductions do relieve poor households, in the absence of a property tax exemption. Moreover, the missing redistributive role of property taxes reflects the fact that they are not based on the actual value of the property. Alternatively, imputed rent could be taxed in place of property. Taxation of imputed rent under personal income has the advantage of assessing more carefully the level of economic well-being, as determined by cash and in-kind income. Nonetheless, estimation of market imputed rents poses some practical difficulties.
The policy debate on mortgage interest tax relief is much more heated in countries not covered by this study (e.g. the Netherlands). Efficiency theories prescribe allowing for mortgage interest tax relief if imputed rent (estimated at market values) is taxed. However, they generate side effects such as over-indebtedness (and its consequences on macroeconomic stability) and an increase in inequality. Mortgage interest tax relief lowers the income tax burden and provides an incentive to work. This translates into higher benefits for higher income earners and is exacerbated by particular tax designs (tax deduction versus tax credit, no cap for mortgage interest subject to tax relief).
Overall, the current favourable tax treatment of housing in many OECD countries may be difficult to support from an efficiency and equity point of view. Indeed, it generates distortions in the allocation of capital and favours higher income taxpayers. A (revenue neutral and) tenure neutral subsidy has a higher redistributive (Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2007) and efficiency potential.
Nonetheless, the large within-group dispersion of income plus imputed rent suggests that the relevant parameters to be taken into account in the design of housing-related policies go beyond tenure status. Analysis shows that the young are clearly penalized by the housing tax and benefit system. Policy reforms aimed at balancing the housing advantage typically enjoyed by the elderly should be designed by taking into account their effects on new (young) entrants to the housing market. Finally, the life-cycle and behavioural dimensions represent important aspects that need to be taken into account in the design of housing-related policies and deserve further research. 
